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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 financial crisis revealed that the American financial 
industry’s regulatory scheme is broken and in desperate need of reform.  
The modern American financial system operates under an antiquated 
regulatory structure developed in the 1930s and 1940s that is ill-
equipped to deal with the intricacies and risks of modern finance.  
Accordingly, reforming financial industry regulation is necessary to deal 
with the complexities of the 21st century financial services industry.  
President Obama championed financial industry reform during his 
campaign and stressed the importance of passing legislation during his 
first year in office.  The House of Representatives recently passed a 
comprehensive piece of legislation reforming the financial industry and 
the Senate will begin working on its version of the bill in early 2010.1  
Tucked into the extensive House bill is the Investor Protection Act of 
2009 (“IPA”), which significantly changes the federal securities laws.2
 
* J.D., 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 2007, Boston College.  I would 
like to thank the editors and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 
for all of their hard work throughout the year.  A special thank you to my parents for 
their unwavering support and encouragement throughout law school. 
 
 1. Carle Hulse, House Approves Tougher Rules on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 2009, at A1. 
 2. Posting of Peter J. Henning to DealBook Blog, 
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/what-the-sec-gains-from-the-financial-
bill/?scp=1&sq=investor%20protection%20act%20of%202009&st=cse (Dec. 15, 2009). 
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This Note addresses a critical section of the IPA: its proposal that 
broker-dealers be held to a new, higher standard of conduct towards 
customers modeled on the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “‘40 
Act”).  Currently, broker-dealers are regulated under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “‘34 Act”) and sometimes held to a fiduciary 
standard of conduct towards customers, whereas investment advisers are 
regulated under the ‘40 Act and always held to a fiduciary standard.  
This bifurcated regulatory scheme—the product of another era when 
broker-dealers and investment advisers were distinct entities—results in 
two different regulatory standards and enforcement mechanisms for 
broker-dealers and investment advisers.  Today, however, broker-dealers 
and investment advisers offer virtually identical services to investors, 
resulting in considerable confusion for both investors and regulators.  
Thus, the IPA seeks to harmonize the regulation of broker-dealers and 
investment advisers by holding both groups to a consistent standard of 
conduct. 
Part II of this Note discusses the history of broker-dealer and 
investment adviser regulation, including the development of different 
legal duties and regulatory schemes for each group.  Part III identifies 
and analyzes the different contexts in which broker-dealers and 
investment advisers are held to a fiduciary standard.  Part IV examines 
the central problems within the current regulatory framework for broker-
dealers and investment advisers.  Part V analyzes the IPA and concludes 
that it is too vague and does far too little to protect broker-dealer 
customers.  Part VI proposes an alternative to the IPA: the adoption of 
an authentic, federal fiduciary standard for broker-dealers that preserves 
a private right of action for investors.  Finally, Part VII concludes that 
this Note’s proposal is a superior alternative to the IPA that would better 
regulate broker-dealers and offer better protection for broker-dealer 
customers. 
 
II. THE FLAWED STATE OF BROKER-DEALER REGULATION:  
HOW WE GOT HERE 
SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter describes the current federal 
securities laws, enacted by Congress in the 1930s and 1940s, as a “badly 
worn patchwork quilt” in desperate need of reform.3
 
 3. Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum 
  Indeed, the 
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regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers is “balkanized” and 
reflects antiquated notions about the functions of broker-dealers and 
investment advisers that are virtually obsolete.4
A.  THE ORIGINS OF BROKER-DEALER REGULATION: THE ‘34 ACT 
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 19345 (the “‘34 Act”) and its 
implementing rules “comprise the most central regulatory apparatus for 
broker-dealers.”6  Section 15(a) of the ‘34 Act requires broker-dealers 
engaged in interstate securities transactions to register with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).7  The ‘34 Act gives 
the SEC broad authority to set rules regarding broker-dealers, including 
the ability to revoke or suspend broker-dealer registration if the broker-
dealer violates federal law or engages in other misconduct.8
An interesting and unique aspect of broker-dealer regulation is the 
SEC’s reliance on self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) to regulate the 
broker-dealer industry.  Although the SEC has the authority to establish 
rules for broker-dealers, it delegates most of this authority to SROs, with 




The ‘34 Act requires broker-dealers to become a member of at least 
one SRO.
  Accordingly, FINRA and its predecessor, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (the “NASD”), have been most 




Ninth Annual Policy Conference: Regulating Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: 
Demarcation or Harmonization? (May 5, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec. 
  Pursuant to this requirement, the NASD was founded in 
1939 and charged with regulating broker-dealers.  FINRA, the contem-
porary successor to the NASD, was created in July 2007 through the 
consolidation of the NASD and the enforcement arm of the New York 
gov/news/speech/2009/spch050509ebw.htm) [hereinafter Walter Speech]. 
 4. See id. 
 5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006). 
 6. ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 7 (RAND Corp. 2008), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf. 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Stuart Kaswell et al., Broker Dealer Regulation—An Overview, Outline, 
1673 PLI/CORP. 9, 17-20 (2008). 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn. 
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Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).11  Accordingly, all broker-dealers, barring 
certain narrow exceptions, are required to register with FINRA.12  
FINRA’s membership statistics demonstrate its considerable mandate: it 
oversees nearly 4,800 brokerage firms, approximately 171,000 branch 
offices, and roughly 644,000 registered securities representatives.13
Under its broad authority from the SEC, the NASD (and now 
FINRA) developed a comprehensive set of rules regulating broker-
dealers, its Rules of Conduct.
 
14  These rules govern virtually every 
aspect of broker-dealer regulation: registration requirements, supervision 
requirements, record-keeping requirements, and most importantly for 
this Note’s purposes, standards regarding broker-dealer duties to 
customers.15
NASD Rule 2310 establishes the standard for a broker-dealer 
making a recommendation regarding a security to a customer: 
suitability.
 
16  Rule 2310 specifies that a broker-dealer making a 
recommendation to a retail customer must have grounds for believing 
that the recommendation is suitable for that customer based on the 
customer’s portfolio, financial situation, and needs.17
[T]he customer’s financial status; 
[T]he customer’s tax status; 
[T]he customer’s investment objectives; 
[S]uch other information used or considered to be reasonable by such 
member or registered representative in making recommendations to 
the customer.
 Moreover, before 
making a recommendation, the broker-dealer must make reasonable 
efforts to discover: 
18
Unlike investment advisers, broker-dealers “are not categorically 
bound—by statute, regulation, or precedent—to a per se rule imposing 
 
 
 11. About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2009) [hereinafter About 
FINRA]. 
 12. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn. 
 13. About FINRA, supra note 11. 
 14. See Kaswell et al., supra note 9, at **17-20. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See FINRA Manual, NASD Rule 2310 (eff. Aug. 20, 1996), available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
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fiduciary obligations toward clients.”19
B. THE ‘40 ACT AND INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION 
  Instead, as discussed below, 
courts and arbitrators determine the applicable standard for a broker-
dealer on a case-by-case basis depending on the circumstances of the 
broker-dealer’s relationship with the client. 
The ‘40 Act “regulates the collection of financial professions that 
typically includes financial planners, money managers, and investment 
consultants.”20  It defines “investment adviser as “any person who, for 
compensation, engages in the business of advising others” about 
investing in or selling securities, or who issues reports or analysis about 
securities for compensation.21
1. Broker-Dealer Exception 
  The ‘40 Act has two aspects that 
distinguish it from the ‘34 Act and directly impact broker-dealer 
regulation. 
The ‘40 Act regulates financial professionals who offer investment 
advice to customers for compensation.  Thus, it would seem that broker-
dealers, who regularly provide investment advice to their customers in 
connection with their broker-dealer business, are subject to the ‘40 Act.  
The ‘40 Act, however, contains a broker-dealer exception: pursuant to 
Section 201, a broker-dealer providing investment advice to a customer 
is not subject to the ‘40 Act if the advice is “solely incidental to the 
conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special 
compensation therefore.”22  The exception recognized that broker-
dealers traditionally provided varying degrees of investment advice to 
their customers in support of their primary function as broker-dealers.23
In recent years, the ‘40 Act’s broker-dealer exception has created 
widespread confusion amongst broker-dealers about whether their 
services were exempt under the ‘40 Act.  This confusion stems from the 




 19. HUNG ET AL., supra note 6, at 10. 
  
 20. See id. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006). 
 22. Id. (emphasis showing exception). 
 23. See generally Curtlan R. McNeily & John P. Moriarty, Regulation of Financial 
Planners, 19 REG. FIN. PL. § 3:9, p. 6. (2009). 
 24. See Rachelle Younglai, Congress Told to Toughen up Broker Standards, 
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Specifically, in the 1990s a growing number of broker-dealers began 
offering fee-based accounts to their customers.  In a fee-based brokerage 
account, broker-dealers “provide customers a package of brokerage 
services—including execution, investment advice, custodial and record-
keeping services—for a fee based on the amounts of assets on account 
with the broker-dealer.”25
Over the last decade, the SEC has repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, 
tried to provide a clear interpretation of the ‘40 Act’s broker-dealer 
exception.  In 1999, in response to the growing trend of broker-dealers 
offering fee-based accounts, the SEC proposed a rule entitled “Certain 
Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Deemed Investment Advisers.”
  Thus, the concern for broker-dealers is 
whether providing investment advice in the context of collecting a fee 
violates the broker-dealer exception’s “no special compensation” 
provision. 
26  
After this rule sparked considerable debate and comment from broker-
dealers, the SEC proposed a further clarification of the broker-dealer 
exception: any broker-dealer providing investment advice that is solely 
incidental to its brokerage services would be exempted from the ‘40 Act, 
regardless of whether it charges a wrap or fixed fee, or transaction-based 
commissions, mark-ups, and mark downs.27
The SEC adopted its final rule regarding the broker-dealer 
exception in April 2005.
  Thus, under the SEC’s 
proposed rule, a broker-dealer would still be exempt from the ‘40 Act, 
even if they received special compensation for their investment advice. 
28  Under the 2005 “final rule,” a broker-dealer 
receiving special compensation would not be deemed an investment 
adviser if the given advice was solely incidental to brokerage services 
and a specific disclosure was given to the customer.29
 
REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5954M 
020091006 (testifying before the U.S. House Financial Services Committee, Texas 
Securities Commissioner Denise Richards observed that, “[t]he migration of 
stockbrokers into the advisory arena . . . has fueled confusion among investors as to the 
services provided by stockbrokers and investment advisers as well as the level of 
protection”). 
  Thus, the rule 
would have exempted broker-dealers from the ‘40 Act, even when the 
 25. Clint A. Corrie, Investment Advisers and Brokers: When is a Broker Subject to 
Fiduciary Duties?  1755 PLI/Corp 81, 107 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 26. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-51523, 70 Fed. Reg. 240424-01 (Apr. 19, 2005). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See generally Corrie, supra note 25, at 97-101. 
 29. See id. 
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broker-dealer received special compensation for investment advice.  The 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, struck down this rule in 2007.30  
In Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, the court held that the SEC rule 
was inconsistent with the ‘40 Act’s text because the ‘40 Act expressly 
provides an exception for broker-dealers giving incidental investment 
advice when no special compensation is paid for the advice.31  Since a 
fee-based account is not transaction-based, it necessarily includes 
compensation for the services rendered—which may include investment 
advice.  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit Court held that the SEC’s rule 
was beyond the scope of the ‘40 Act and that the SEC had exceeded its 
authority under the statute.32
The SEC declined to appeal the D.C. Circuit’s decision and instead 
proposed a new interpretative rule
 
33 providing a three-part analysis for 
determining whether a broker-dealer is subject to the ‘40 Act: (1) 
advisory status should be determined on account-by-account basis; (2) a 
broker-dealer does not receive “special compensation” simply because it 
charges different commissions for different brokerage services; and (3) a 
broker-dealer exercising investment discretion, other than limited or 
temporary discretion, is subject to the ‘40 Act.34
The foregoing demonstrates the confused state of broker-dealer 
regulation regarding whether broker-dealers are investment advisers.  
The SEC’s inability to offer clear guidance on the ‘40 Act’s broker-
dealer exception, coupled with the D.C. Circuit decision, demonstrates 
that even the SEC does not have a firm handle on the interplay between 
broker-dealers and investment advisers regarding their respective 
functions and regulatory schemes. 
 
2. SEC Regulation and No Private Right of Action 
The ‘40 Act establishes a markedly different regulatory framework 
for investment advisers in comparison to the ‘34 Act’s regulation of 
broker-dealers.  Unlike the ‘34 Act, the ‘40 Act does not establish an 
SRO to regulate investment advisers; instead, it retains that authority 
 
 30. See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 31. See id. at 488, 492-93. 
 32. Id.  “The final rule’s exemption for broker-dealers is broader than the statutory 
exemption for broker-dealers under [the ‘40 Act].” Id. at 488. 
 33. See Corrie, supra note 25, at 100-01. 
 34. Id. 
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within the purview of the SEC.35  The ‘40 Act requires investment 
advisers, unless exempt, to register with the SEC and complete a 
disclosure document, Form ADV.36  Moreover, unlike the ‘34 Act, the 
‘40 Act does not provide a private cause of action for damages.37
 
  
Instead, the SEC enforces the ‘40 Act via administrative and civil 
actions. 
III. THE ‘34 ACT AND THE ‘40 ACT: WHO IS A FIDUCIARY? 
As discussed herein, the ‘34 Act and the ‘40 Act impose different 
rules and duties upon broker-dealers and investment advisers.  The most 
important distinction between the two involves duties to customers.  
Specifically, investment advisers always owe their customers a fiduciary 
duty pursuant to the ‘40 Act.38  In contrast, broker-dealers abide by 
FINRA rules (including the suitability standard) and only owe their 
customers a fiduciary duty in limited circumstances.  Nevertheless, 
customers bringing complaints against their broker-dealers will often 
argue that their broker-dealer owed them a fiduciary duty as it requires a 
“heightened duty to act on another’s behalf, in good faith, with honesty, 
with trust, with care, and with candor.”39
The question of whether a broker-dealer owes a fiduciary duty to a 
client has been extensively litigated over the years, and thus a rich body 
  A broker-dealer found to owe 
a fiduciary duty to a customer is more likely to have violated the duty 
and be held liable to the customer because it is such a high standard, and 
as a result, is often liable to the customer. 
 
 35. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a), (b) (2006) (describing the circumstances 
under which investment advisers are either required or exempt from registration). 
 36. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(a) (2009).  Among the required disclosures, Form 
ADV requires information regarding the adviser’s basic fee structure, the nature of the 
adviser’s services, client base, and broker discretion, its basic fee structure and whether 
it is negotiable, and the adviser’s business activities that may engender conflicts of 
interest.  See SEC, Form ADV: Part II, Uniform Application for Investment Advisor 
Registration, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-part2.pdf. 
 37. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 
(1979) (holding that the ‘40 Act provides only a limited private remedy to void an 
investment advisers contract but no other private cause of action). 
 38. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963) (“[The] fundamental purpose [of the ‘40 Act was] to achieve a high standard of 
business ethics in the securities industry.”). 
 39. HUNG ET AL., supra note 6, at 10. 
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of case law has developed on the subject.  Part A of this section 
discusses the development of the fiduciary duty standard for investment 
advisers under the ‘40 Act.  Part B then analyzes the substantial body of 
case law addressing the circumstances in which broker-dealers owe their 
customers a fiduciary duty. 
A. INVESTMENT ADVISERS: ALWAYS FIDUCIARIES 
Under the ‘40 Act, an investment adviser is a fiduciary with respect 
to its clients and has an affirmative duty to act in their best interests.40  
“Although the specific standards for fiduciary obligations are not laid 
out clearly in the statute, they are unambiguously a centerpiece of the 
[‘40 Act’s] differential treatment of investment advisers.”41  The 
Supreme Court held that the ‘40 Act creates a fiduciary duty for 
investment advisers in its landmark 1963 decision, SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau.42  In Capital Gains, the Court engaged in a lengthy 
analysis of the ‘40 Act, and observed that its fundamental purpose, in the 
aftermath of the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression, was 
to “achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities 
industry.”43  The Court further held that because the ‘40 Act recognized 
an investment adviser’s “fiduciary relationship to his clients,” it requires 
investment advisers to act in their clients’ best interests; avoid conflicts 
of interest; and fully disclose to their clients all unavoidable conflicts of 
interest.44
B. BROKER-DEALERS: FIDUCIARIES?  IT DEPENDS 
  Federal and state courts have uniformly held that the ‘40 Act 
includes a fiduciary duty in the over four decades since Capital Gains 
was decided; thus, there is no doubt that investment advisers registered 
under the ‘40 Act are held to a fiduciary standard. 
The case law concerning broker-dealers and fiduciary duties is a 
morass.  In contrast to the uniform case law regarding the ‘40 Act’s 
fiduciary duty standard, the case law on broker-dealers and fiduciary 
duties is complex and fact-specific.  Unlike investment advisers, 
“broker-dealers are not categorically bound—by statute, regulation, or 
 
 40. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 194. 
 41. HUNG ET AL., supra note 6, at 13. 
 42. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191-92. 
 43. Id. at 186. 
 44. Id. at 201. 
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precedent—to a per se rule imposing fiduciary obligations toward 
clients.”45 The case law is generally divisible into two broad categories: 
(1) the more common situation, where the broker-dealer and the 
customer have a principal/agent relationship in which the broker simply 
executes the customer’s orders (nondiscretionary accounts); and (2) the 
situation where a broker-dealer exercises control over the customer’s 
account (discretionary accounts).46
1. Nondiscretionary Accounts 
 
In nondiscretionary accounts, broker-dealers and their customers 
have principal/agent relationships with their clients in which the broker-
dealer does not have discretion or control of client assets.47  In this 
context, the courts and the SEC generally have concluded that broker-
dealers do not owe fiduciary duties to their clients.”48  Several recent 
cases demonstrate this point.  In Welch v. TD Ameritrade, customers 
brought a putative class action against broker-dealers TD Ameritrade 
and Merrill Lynch, asserting a variety of claims, including a common 
law claim for breach of fiduciary duty, relating to the broker-dealers’ 
“cash sweep programs.”49  The court, however, dismissed the customers’ 
suit.  Addressing their fiduciary duty claim, the court held that under 
New York law, the “mere existence of a broker-customer relationship is 
not proof of its fiduciary character.”50  The court further held that when 
parties deal in arms-length commercial transactions, “no relation of 
confidence or trust sufficient to find the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship will arise absent extraordinary circumstances.”51  Thus, the 
court ruled that because the plaintiffs held ordinary, nondiscretionary 
accounts with their broker-dealers, they failed to allege any facts 
establishing that the broker-dealers had breached the “limited duties that 
they owed to Plaintiffs in regard to their brokerage accounts.”52
 
 45. HUNG ET AL., supra note 6, at 10. 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Corrie, supra note 25, at 85. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Welch v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., No. 07 Civ. 6904(RJS), 2009 WL 
2356131 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009). 
 50. Id. at *41. 
 51. Id. at *40. 
 52. Id. at *44 (emphasis added). 
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In its ruling, the TD Ameritrade court relied heavily53 on 
DeKwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co.,54 a landmark 2002 Second 
Circuit case that closely examines the extent of a broker-dealer’s duties 
to its customer in the context of a unique fact pattern.  In that case, 
Plaintiff Henryk de Kwiatkowski (“Kwiatkowski”) was a wealthy 
individual who made and lost hundreds of millions dollars trading 
currency futures through his broker-dealer, Bear Stearns (“Bear”).55  
Ultimately, Kwiatkowski lost $215 million and sued Bear Stearns, and 
his individual broker, for common law negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty.  Kwiatkowski alleged that Bear and his broker failed to 
adequately warn him of risks, failed to keep him apprised of certain 
market forecasts, and gave him negligent advice concerning the timing 
of his trades.56  The trial court found Bear negligent and awarded 
Kwiatkowski $111.5 million in damages.57
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s 
decision, holding that Bear did not owe Kwiatkowski a fiduciary duty 
and that Bear competently, rather than negligently, fulfilled the limited 
duties it owed to Kwiatkowski as a nondiscretionary brokerage account 
customer.  The court of appeals, in its thorough analysis of the broker-
dealer/customer relationship, provides a concise description of the 
limited duties a broker-dealer owes to a customer with a 
nondiscretionary account: 
 
[A] broker ordinarily has no duty to monitor a nondiscretionary 
account, or to give advice to such a customer on an ongoing basis. 
The broker’s duties ordinarily end after each transaction is done, and 
thus do not include a duty to offer unsolicited information, advice, or 
warnings concerning the customer’s investments . . . . On a 
transaction-by-transaction basis, the broker owes duties of diligence 
and competence in executing the client’s trade orders, and is obliged 
to give honest and complete information when recommending a 
purchase or sale. The client may enjoy the broker’s advice and 
recommendations with respect to a given trade, but has no legal 
claim on the broker’s ongoing attention.58
Kwiatkowski argued that Bear “undertook a substantial and 
 
 
 53. Id. at **41-44. 
 54. 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 55. Id. at 1295-96. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1302. 
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comprehensive advisory role” with respect to his account that triggered 
an ongoing duty on Bear’s part to offer advice and warnings between 
transactions.59  Because Bear undertook this duty, Kwiatkowski argued 
that Bear had assumed an ongoing duty to provide advice, which it 
violated when it did not inform him of several internal Bear reports 
containing information critical to Kwiatkowski’s trading positions.60  
The court of appeals, however, found this argument meritless: a broker’s 
“giving advice on particular occasions does not alter the character of the 
relationship by triggering an ongoing duty to advise in the future (or 
between transactions) or to monitor all data potentially relevant to a 
customer’s investment.”61
The Court of Appeals also addressed an issue raised at the trial 
court level, but not on appeal: the “special circumstances” argument.  
Specifically, the district court alluded to the “special circumstances” 
surrounding Kwiatkowski’s account,
 
62 although it is unclear to what 
extent the district court relied on “special circumstances” as a basis for 
imputing an ongoing duty of reasonable care to Bear.  Interestingly, the 
court of appeals acknowledged that there are “transformative special 
circumstances” that create a special duty for broker-dealers beyond the 
duty of reasonable care normally applicable to a broker’s actions in 
nondiscretionary accounts.  These include, inter alia, cases in which a 
client has impaired faculties; cases where the client and broker have a 
closer than arms-length relationship; or scenarios where the customer is 
so lacking in sophistication that the broker has de facto control over the 
account.63  In sum, the law “imposes additional extra-contractual duties 
on brokers who can take unfair advantage of their customers’ incapacity 
or simplicity.”64  Accordingly, the court of appeals found the special 
circumstances theory inapplicable to Kwiatkowski, the “very opposite of 
the naïve and vulnerable client” protected by the special circumstances 
theory.65
 
 59. Id. at 1307. 
 
 60. DeKwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1303. 
 61. Id. at 1307. 
 62. Stating that the special circumstances being “[i]ts massive scale, the frequency 
of Kwiatkowski’s contacts with Bear executives, and the ‘unique risk’ run by a private 
individual speculating in currency on a scale known only to governments of large 
countries.” See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1308. 
 65. Id. at 1309. 
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2. Discretionary Accounts 
In contrast, brokers handling discretionary accounts can execute 
trades on their clients’ behalf and generally owe a fiduciary duty to these 
clients.66
 
  The logic behind this heightened duty is straightforward: the 
client’s delegation of control to the broker gives the broker considerable 
power, and that power is accompanied by new obligations to their 
customer, i.e. fiduciary duties.  Thus, broker-dealer customers holding 
discretionary accounts enjoy the heightened protection of a fiduciary 
standard. 
IV.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK:  
INVESTOR CONFUSION AND DIFFERING LEGAL STANDARDS FOR 
BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
As seen above, the contemporary distinction between broker-
dealers and investment advisers is complex and increasingly blurred.  
Indeed, although broker-dealers and investment advisers are regulated 
by different statutes and different regulatory bodies, they “provide 
practically indistinguishable services to retail investors and direct them 
to the same [financial] products.”67
 
 66. See, e.g., Marchese v. Nelson, 809 F. Supp. 880 (D. Utah 1993); see also 
Lautenberg Found. v. Madoff, Civil Action No. 09-816 (SRC), 2009 WL 2928913, at 
*7 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (holding that “under both New York and New Jersey law, a 
fiduciary duty exists between a broker and a client where the customer has delegated 
discretionary trading authority to the broker”) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
  Unsurprisingly, this complexity 
creates considerable confusion for investors, who are generally uncertain 
about the distinction between investment advisers and broker-dealers.  
Moreover, investors are largely unaware of the different legal duties of 
broker-dealers and investment advisers.  These problems—investor 
confusion and differing legal duties—diminish investor protection, a 
principal goal of the ‘34 and ‘40 Acts.  Accordingly, any new regulation 
of the financial industry must alleviate investor confusion about the 
different functions and legal duties of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.  As one SEC commissioner put it, “[i]nvestors should receive 
the same level of protection when they purchase comparable products 
 67. Walter Speech, supra note 3. 
216 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
and services, regardless of the financial professional involved.”68
Part A of this section discusses investor confusion regarding 
broker-dealers and investment advisers, while Part B analyzes a recent 
case that encapsulates the problem with having different legal standards 
for broker-dealers and investment advisers. 
 
A. INVESTOR CONFUSION REGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
BROKER-DEALERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS 
In 2008, the SEC enlisted the Rand Institute to analyze current 
broker-dealer and investment adviser business practices and investigate 
investor understanding about the differences between, and relationships 
among, broker-dealers and investment advisers.69  After a compre-
hensive industry review, the Rand Institute issued a detailed, 204-page 
report, Investor and Industry Perspectives on Investment Advisers and 
Broker-Dealers (“Rand Report”).70
The Rand Report’s statistical data highlights the blurred line 
between broker-dealers and investment advisers.  Specifically, it notes 
that roughly “40% of all broker-dealers either directly or indirectly 
control, are controlled by, or are under common control with a firm 
engaged in the securities or investment advisory business.”
 
71  
Furthermore, 69% of “large” broker-dealers “reported affiliations with 
securities or investment advisory businesses.”72  These statistics under-
score the complexity of relationships in the financial services industry.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that “the typical retail investor finds it difficult to 
understand the nature of the business” that is providing them with 
investment advisory or brokerage services.73  Indeed, the Rand Report 
concludes that most investors do not understand general distinctions 
between broker-dealers and investment advisers, including their 
different legal duties.74
 
 68. Id. 
 
 69. HUNG ET AL., supra note 6, at xiv. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at xvii. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at xviii. 
 74. Id. at 118. 
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B. DIFFERENT STANDARDS RESULT IN LESS INVESTOR PROTECTION 
A recent case, Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 
underscores investor confusion regarding the differences between 
broker-dealers and investment advisers.75
The Thomas case is straightforward.  In June 2003, the Thomases 
purchased a Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Met Life”) variable 
universal life insurance policy.
  More importantly, however, it 
demonstrates why having two different legal duties for broker-dealers 
and investment advisers diminishes investor protection. 
76  In doing so, they acted on the advice 
of their registered representative, an employee of Met Life’s affiliated 
broker-dealer, Metropolitan Securities, Inc. (“Metropolitan Secu-
rities”).77
The Thomas court provides an insightful analysis of the broker-
dealer exception’s three requirements.  First, it was clear that Met Life 
was a broker.
  The Thomases subsequently filed suit, arguing that Met Life 
and Metropolitan Securities owed them a fiduciary duty under the ‘40 
Act.  They argued that their registered representative violated this duty 
when he failed to disclose that he received considerable benefits when 
selling Met Life financial products (including the Met Life insurance 
policy bought by the Thomases).  The court dismissed this argument and 
held that the ‘40 Act’s broker-dealer exception rendered its fiduciary 
standard inapplicable to Met Life and its affiliated broker-dealer. 
78  Second, the court held that Met Life’s investment 
adviser service was “solely incidental to” its brokerage function because 
it read this provision of the statute to mean “solely in connection with” 
and it was undisputed that the registered representative’s advice was 
solely connected to the Thomases purchase of the insurance policy.79
Where the product being sold is a sophisticated financial product . . . 
  
Finally, the court held that the Thomases did not provide their registered 
representative with any “special compensation” for his investment 
advice. Nevertheless, the Thomas court noted the incongruity of 
exempting Met Life from the ‘40 Act’s fiduciary standard in spite of its 
inherent conflict of interest: 
 
 75. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663 (W.D. 
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009). 
 76. Id. at *2. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at *3. 
 79. Id. at *7. 
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it would seem that the need for unbiased advice—or at least for the 
disclosure of those things that might tend to skew the [registered 
representative’s] “advice”—would seem to be every bit as great as in 
a conventional advisory relationship.80
With this observation, the Thomas court struck upon the central 
problem within the broker-dealer/investment adviser regulatory 
dichotomy: broker-dealer customers are afforded less protection than 
investment adviser customers because broker-dealers are generally not 
held to a fiduciary standard.  Indeed, the judicial interpretation of 
broker-dealer duties has consistently held that, because broker-dealers 
are not fiduciaries, they owe their clients a limited set of obligations.  
Thus, even though FINRA has extensive rules in place regarding broker-
dealer conduct, they do not collectively rise to a fiduciary standard.  In 




V. THE INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT OF 2009 
In response to the inefficient and ineffective state of broker-dealer 
and investment adviser regulation, there is widespread support for 
reforming broker-dealer regulation.  Indeed, the majority of SEC 
Commissioners, including Chairwoman Mary Schapiro, support the 
adoption of a fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and the 
“harmonization” of regulation between broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.81  Similarly, FINRA Chairman Richard Ketchum argues that a 
consistent fiduciary standard for investment advisers and broker dealers 
is necessary to improve investor protection and eliminate the regulatory 
gap between broker-dealers and investment advisers.82
 
 80. Id. at *9. 
  Even the 
 81. See Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech Before the SIFMA Annual 
Conference: The Road to Investor Conference (Oct. 27, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102709mls.htm) [hereinafter Schapiro 
Speech]; Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Speech Before the Investment Advisers 
Association Annual Conference: SEC’s Oversight of the Adviser Industry Bolsters 
Investor Protection (May 7, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050709laa.htm) [hereinafter Aguilar 
Speech]; Walter Speech, supra note 3. 
 82. See Kathleen M. McBride, FINRA’s Ketchum Speaks of Fiduciary Duty, 
INVESTMENT ADVISOR, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.investmentadvisor.com/News/2009/ 
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Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), Wall 
Street’s main lobbying group, began calling for a fiduciary standard for 
broker-dealers, abandoning its long-held opposition to such a measure.83
In light of these widespread calls for reform, it is unsurprising that 
the IPA amends the ‘34 and ‘40 Act provisions regarding the conduct 
and regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers.
 
84
A. THE IPA’S PROVISIONS REGARDING BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 
  Part A of 
this section describes these amendments and Part B argues that they are 
flawed and do not do enough to protect investors. 
Section 103 of the IPA seeks to reform broker-dealer regulation via 
several amendments to the ‘34 and ‘40 Acts.85  First, the bill seeks to 
harmonize broker-dealer and investment adviser standards of conduct by 
amending the ‘34 Act so that broker-dealers offering investment advice 
are subject to the same standard of conduct as investment advisers under 
the ‘40 Act.86  Second, the IPA gives the SEC the authority to 
promulgate rules establishing a uniform standard of conduct for broker-
dealers and investment advisers offering investment advice.  The bill 
contains guidelines for the standard of conduct: broker-dealers and 
investment advisers offering investment advice to retail customers “shall 
. . . act in the best interest of the customer without regard 
to[their]financial or other interest.”87
 
10/Pages/FINRAs-Ketchum-Speaks-of-Fiduciary-Duty.aspx. 
  Finally, the IPA attempts to 
harmonize the enforcement and remedy options for violations of this 
new conduct standard.  Specifically, it mandates that the enforcement 
 83. Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, 
Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance 
Office: Hearing Before the H. Fin. Services Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of 
John Taft, Chairman, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)).  
Nevertheless, some believe that SIFMA supports a “less than fiduciary standard” that 
would favor the brokerage industry. See Alexis Leondis & Jeff Plungis, Financial 
Planners Say Fiduciary Debate May Favor Brokers, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 7, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20603037&sid=aDRJvkh6IQGk. 
 84. See Investor Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 3817, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 85. See id. § 103. 
 86. See id. § 103(a) (“[W]ith respect to a broker or dealer that is providing 
investment advice to a retail customer . . . the standard of conduct for such broker or 
dealer with respect to such customer shall be the same as the standard of conduct 
applicable to an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.”). 
 87. Id. 
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and remedy options for violations of this new standard of conduct will 
be the same as the ‘40 Act’s enforcement and remedy options,88
B. THE IPA’S SHORTCOMINGS 
 i.e. no 
private right of action and SEC enforcement.  In sum, the IPA 
establishes a uniform standard of conduct for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers; delegates to the SEC the task of establishing this 
standard; and strips investors of their right to sue in the event that 
broker-dealers violate this new standard of conduct. 
The IPA contains two critical flaws that hinder its ability to fully 
protect investors from unscrupulous broker-dealers.  First, because the 
IPA delegates power to the SEC to establish the specific elements of 
broker-dealer/investment adviser conduct, it leaves open the possibility 
that a “real” fiduciary standard will not be adopted.  Second, by 
eliminating a private right of action for broker-dealer customers, the IPA 
takes a powerful enforcement tool out of investors’ hands. 
1. The IPA Does Not Establish a True Fiduciary Standard 
Although promising at first glance, the IPA’s language regarding a 
uniform standard of conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers 
is weak for two reasons.  First, although it references “the best interests 
of the customer,” the IPA only applies to broker-dealers “giving 
investment advice” to retail customers.  This exception leaves the door 
wide open for broker-dealers not offering investment advice to be 
exempt from the new standard.  In theory, this potential loophole would 
allow unscrupulous broker-dealers to offer their clients minimal or no 
investment advice to avoid the new standard and engage in conflicts of 
interest and other conduct prohibited by a fiduciary standard. This 
illogical result—a lower standard of care for broker-dealers taking less 
of an interest in their customers—is untenable. 
The second, and more important, issue regarding the IPA’s 
supposed fiduciary standard is that it does not actually establish the 
standard, instead delegating that responsibility to the SEC.  This raises 
the concern that the SEC will ultimately establish a less than fiduciary 
 
 88. See id. § 103(b) (“[T]he enforcement options and remedies available for 
violations of the standard of conduct applicable to a broker or dealer providing 
investment advice to a retail customer are commensurate with those enforcement 
options and remedies available for violations” of the ‘40 Act.). 
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standard that favors broker-dealers.89  As one investor advocate notes, 
the fear is that “if the SEC [decides] what the fiduciary duty is, it would 
lower the standard in order to accommodate [broker-dealer] business 
practices.”90  Here, some investment advisers worry that because SEC 
Chairwoman Schapiro and Commissioner Walter both spent years 
working at the NASD (now FINRA), they may be inclined to adopt a 
lower standard for broker-dealers.91
Fortunately, Chairwoman Schapiro and Commissioner Walter 
support adopting a strong fiduciary standard for broker-dealers.  
Chairwoman Schapiro has warned against implementing a “watered-
down, ‘fair and reasonable’ commercial standard” for broker-dealers 
offering investment advice.
  This would be unacceptable. 
92  Commissioner Walter has stated that a 
“fiduciary standard should apply uniformly to all financial 
professionals.”93  Similarly, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar has noted 
that the fiduciary relationship is the “foundation” of the adviser-client 
relationship, and that any attempt to establish a new standard of conduct 
for broker-dealers must “keep sacrosanct a real fiduciary standard.”94  
Commissioner Aguilar further remarked that he did not consider it a 
“real question” whether or not broker-dealers should be subject to a 
fiduciary standard.95
2. No Private Right of Action for Customers 
  Nevertheless, public support does not ensure that 
the SEC will ultimately implement a strong fiduciary standard. 
The IPA is also problematic for investor protection because it 
eliminates their ability to bring a cause of action against broker-dealers 
for alleged violations of the new standard of conduct.  As discussed 
herein, there is no private right of action for investors under the ‘40 Act.  
By harmonizing the enforcement remedies of the ‘34 Act with those of 
the ‘40 Act, the IPA leaves enforcement of the new standard of conduct 
to the SEC.  This is flawed because “regulation without enforcement 
lacks teeth” and the SEC is already unable to monitor and investigate the 
 
 89. See Jane J. Kim, Fiduciary Duty Hits the Street—Sort Of, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
31, 2009, at A23. 
 90. Leondis & Plungis, supra note 83. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Schapiro Speech, supra note 81. 
 93. Walter Speech, supra note 3. 
 94. Aguilar Speech, supra note 81. 
 95. Id. 
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approximately 5,500 broker-dealers and 11,000 investment advisers 
under its purview.96
 
  By leaving enforcement of a new conduct standard 
to an already overstretched SEC and stripping investors of their private 
remedy, the IPA ensures that the new conduct standard will lack the 
“teeth” necessary to adequately protect investors. 
VI.  AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL:  
AN AUTHENTIC FEDERAL FIDUCIARY STANDARD FOR  
BROKER-DEALERS WITH A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
In light of the IPA’s flaws, this Note presents an alternative 
approach to regulating broker-dealer conduct: a federal law establishing 
an authentic fiduciary standard for all registered broker-dealers that 
preserves an investor’s private right of action.  Specifically, this Note 
favors the adoption of an “authentic” fiduciary standard for broker-
dealers modeled on the five principals outlined by the Committee for the 
Fiduciary Standard, an investor advocacy group lobbying Congress “to 
ensure investors’ best interest are number one in financial reform 
legislation.”97
 
A. AN AUTHENTIC FEDERAL FIDUCIARY STANDARD  
FOR ALL REGISTERED BROKER-DEALERS 
  Part A of this section outlines the “authentic” fiduciary 
standard’s five components, and argues why their adoption is in 
investors’ best interests.  Part B advocates maintaining a private right of 
action for investors to remedy alleged broker-dealer violations of the 
new standard.  Part C analyzes how this new standard would affect 
broker-dealers and investors in practice. 
Congress should adopt an authentic federal fiduciary standard for 
all registered broker-dealers.  Specifically, this federal standard should 
contain the following five principles: 
1. Put the client’s best interests first; 
2. Act with prudence—that is, with the skill, care, diligence and 
good judgment of a professional; 
3. Do not mislead clients; provide conspicuous, full and fair 
disclosure of all important facts; 
 
 96. See Walter Speech, supra note 3. 
 97. See generally Committee for the Fiduciary Standard, 
http://www.thefiduciarystandard.org/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
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4. Avoid conflicts of interest; 
5. Fully disclose and fairly manage, in the client’s favor, unavoidable 
conflicts.98
Adopting this standard is beneficial for two reasons.  First, it 
contains all of the elements of a true fiduciary standard, offering strong 
protection for investors and holding broker-dealers to a high standard of 
conduct.  As the chairwoman of the National Association of Personal 
Financial Advisors puts it, “[f]rom the perspective of regulation, the big 
issue is how you define fiduciary” and any broker-dealer attempt to 




B. PRESERVING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
  Establishing a fiduciary standard with these five core 
principles would ensure a robust, rather than watered-down, fiduciary 
standard for broker-dealers.  Moreover, establishing the fiduciary stand-
ard at the federal level avoids the danger of the SEC establishing a less-
than fiduciary standard for broker-dealers. 
Regulation without enforcement is ineffective.  To offer true 
investor protection, this new federal fiduciary standard must give 
investors a private right of action to seek redress for alleged broker-
dealer violations.  A private right of action would have two benefits.  
First, and most obviously, it would allow investors to seek damages for 
alleged broker-dealer violations.  A less apparent, but still important, 
benefit would be the collective effect a private right of action would 
have on broker-dealer conduct.  Broker-dealers would be less likely to 
violate their fiduciary duty to a customer if that customer could bring a 
cause of action against the broker-dealer.  Without a private right of 
action, however, a broker-dealer, confident in the SEC and/or FINRA’s 
inability to investigate nearly 5,000 broker-dealers, would be more 
likely to engage in prohibited conduct. 
 
 98. Id. (“The authentic fiduciary standard refers to the well-developed body of 
fiduciary law established by ERISA, UPIA, the Advisers Act, and other laws and 
regulations.  The Committee is opposed to any effort to redefine a fiduciary standard in 
a manner that would dilute the authentic standard.”). 
 99. Leondis & Plungis, supra note 83. 
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C. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THIS NOTE’S PROPOSAL 
This Note acknowledges that any new broker-dealer regulation has 
several potential drawbacks, namely, burdensome costs (that would 
undoubtedly be passed on to customers); adverse effects on broker-
dealer compensation; and cumbersome implementation resulting in 
excessive “red-tape,” rather than actual benefits to investors.  
Nevertheless, this Note concludes that the practical benefits of this 
proposed federal fiduciary standard outweigh the potential drawbacks. 
An authentic fiduciary standard for all broker-dealers would end 
“the era of regulating brokers under a commercial standard that treats 
advice as a byproduct without fiduciary accountability.”100  Indeed, an 
authentic fiduciary standard would foster an increase in the level of 
professionalism and client services throughout the broker-dealer 
industry by forcing broker-dealers to increase their standards in 
accordance with the new law.  Regarding increased costs, there could 
very well be a short-term cost increase to broker-dealers because of 
increased litigation costs (defending larger amounts investor claims) and 
compliance costs (training employees regarding the new standard).  
Over time, however, an authentic federal fiduciary standard would 
probably decrease costs to broker-dealers and customers by lessening 
the number of broker-dealer/customer disputes (and litigation expenses) 
as broker-dealers begin to abide by the newly instituted fiduciary duty to 
their clients.  Likewise, this standard would also weed out unscrupulous 
broker-dealers who prove unable to meet their fiduciary obligations to 
customers.  Thus, this Note’s proposal has the potential to usher in a 
“new era of fiduciary responsibility and accountability.”101
Critics of a broad fiduciary standard for broker dealers question 
how such a standard would affect broker-dealer compensation.  For 
instance, could brokers still earn commissions or sell their firms 
proprietary products?
 
102  Would the broker-dealer industry need to shift 
towards charging percentage-of-assets fees?103
 
 100. Blaine F. Aiken, How a “Universal” Fiduciary Standard Would Change How 
Financial Advisers Do Business, INVESTMENT NEWS, May 10, 2009, 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090510/REG/305109993. 
  Former SEC Chairman 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Suzanne Barlyn, Investing in Funds: A Monthly Analysis—Adviser Alert: 
News for Brokers, Wealth Managers, and Their Clients, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 
R6. 
 103. See id. 
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William H. Donaldson describes the compensation question as a “tough 
area” to deal with.104  Nevertheless, these criticisms miss the mark.  
Commissions can exist in a fiduciary relationship, provided that the 
broker-dealer provides full disclosure to the customer about the 
commissions and fees, in particular those received by other parties.105  
So in the context of the Thomas case discussed earlier, the Met Life 
broker-dealer, under this Note’s proposed fiduciary standard, would not 
have been liable to the Thomases if he fully disclosed any extra 
commissions/compensation he received from Met Life for selling their 
product, and presented comparable annuity policies from other insurance 
companies.  Moreover, full disclosure would eliminate unsavory 
compensation practices.  Indeed, “[h]ow many people would buy a 
variable annuity if the broker had to reveal that he stands to win a flat-




Established almost 80 years ago, the current regulatory framework 
for broker-dealers and investment-advisers is outdated.  Since the 1990s, 
the broker-dealer industry has undergone considerable changes, with an 
increasing number of financial professionals offering a vast array of 
financial products and services.  These changes render the regulatory 
distinction between broker-dealers and investment advisers obsolete.  
Instead of protecting customers, the regulatory scheme established by 
the ‘34 and ‘40 Acts actually diminishes investor protections and 
increases investor confusion regarding financial professionals.  The 
Investor Protection Act of 2009 recognizes the flawed state of broker-
dealer regulation and represents a decent attempt at reform.  
Nevertheless, it is flawed because it does not guarantee that broker-
dealers will be held to a fiduciary standard when dealing with all of their 
clients.  This Note’s proposal is superior to the IPA because it holds 
broker-dealers to an authentic fiduciary standard.  An authentic fiduciary 
standard for broker-dealers would raise industry standards and offer true 
protection for broker-dealer customers. 
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. Id. 
